bandwidth question. (2.7.3.) For the sake of simplicity we assume that in any single 100-msec integration period of the global workspace only one internally consistent message can gain access. However, the evidence on this point may be arguable, so that we mark this as a theoretical choice-point. See minimum integration time.

behaviorism. Influential physicalistic philosophy of psychology, some forms of which commonly deny the existence or functionality of consciousness. 

belief. (7.6.1.) An abstract concept that is not disputed in the stream of thought, though plausibly it could be. A belief system may be defined as a consistent set of such undisputed thoughts, which may serve as a Dominant Frame Stack for many conscious thoughts, feelings and actions. A closed belief system is one that has a ready answer to all apparent counter-arguments, so that any possibility of change is minimized (Rokeach, 1960). See also Decision-making Function, ideomotor theory.

biofeedback training. There is evidence that any neural system can come under voluntary control, at least temporarily, by arranging for a conscious feedback signal whenever the target system is active. This remarkable capacity provides one argument for truly global broadcasting of conscious information (2.5). See “any” arguments. 

bi-stable perceptual events. Many stimuli can be interpreted in more than one way. Some involve reversible bi-stable stimuli, like the Necker Cube or figure-ground illusions. Much more common are non-reversible cases. Perceptual learning typically shows non-reversible hi-stability. The “Dalmatian” demonstration in 5.1.1 provides one example. See also ambiguity. 

“blind sight.” Damage to the primary visual cortex sometimes leads to a condition in which the victim can recognize visual objects without a sense of their being conscious. This is an interesting and important phenomenon, but we argue that such difficult cases are not to be used for constructing an adequate theory in the first instance (1.1.2). They are, however, a challenge for a theory built upon more common phenomena.

brain duality. The two cerebral hemispheres are well known to have a major division down the midline, connected only by the corpus callosum. In fact, there are midline divisions even in the midbrain and possibly the brain stem. This is a puzzling feature from the viewpoint of GW theory, which emphasizes unity rather than duality. One possibility is that brain duality has a primarily developmental role (3.3).

broadcasting. See global distribution. 

central limited capacity. Consciousness is associated with a central “bottleneck” in information processing, as shown by selective attention, dual-task measures, and the limitations of immediate memory. (1.3.4). By contrast, unconscious specialized processors, taken together, have much greater processing capacity. See also automaticity. 

Chevreul pendulum. A classic demonstration of ideomotor control (7.4.1). 

coalition formation. See cooperative processing.  

cognitive architectures. Cognitive theories that focus on the entire human information-processing system, rather than on particular subsystems such as Short Term Memory, language, or vision (1.3.6). 

coma. Damage to parts of the brain delimited by the Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating System (ERTAS) seems to lead to coma. This can be interpreted as damage to the neural equivalent of a global workspace system (3.1.2). 

common sense (1.3.1). Originally, the general sense modality that is presumed to provide common ground between the special senses like vision and hearing. This traditional idea has much in common with a global workspace. The common sense explained the interaction between the special senses and their ability to share certain features like location, causality, and time of a single event. Aristotle proposed a set of modern-sounding cognitive arguments for the common sense, but this concept is also known in Eastern philosophy.

competition for access to consciousness. There are two kinds of competition, either between potentially conscious stimuli (e.g., in a dual-task paradigm), or between different controlling frames when the input is the same (e.g., switching between two interpretations of a stimulus in binocular rivalry or in linguistic ambiguity). Most cases of competition seem to involve both (2.3, 4.3.5, 6.5.1, 7.8). 

computational inefficiency of conscious processes (2.1.1). Conscious processes are generally much less efficient than comparable unconscious ones. Consciously controlled skills are slower, involve more mutual interference, and are more prone to error than the same skills after automatization (see also automaticity).

conceptual frame. Unconscious constraints on conscious access to abstract concepts. Specifically, the conceptual presupposed knowledge needed to use conscious concepts but which is itself difficult to access. 

conceptual Redundancy Effects. Repetitive concepts become more difficult to access consciously. See also semantic satiation, Redundancy Effects. 

conceptual versus perceptual conscious contents. See qualitative conscious experiences, nonqualitative conscious events. 

conflict-free sphere of conscious access and control (7.8.3.). A term borrowed from ego psychology to denote the domain in which deep goal frames are not in conflict, so that a variety of conscious contents can be accessed with minimal mental effort.

conscious access versus conscious experience. We speak of qualitative conscious experiences as in perception, mental imagery, inner speech, or feelings. All these events have experienced dimensions: color, taste, texture, discrete boundaries in space and time, etc. We speak of conscious access in cases such as accurately reported, currently “conscious” concepts, beliefs, and intentions where there are generally no reported conscious qualities (1.5.4, 4.0.0, 6.5.2, 7.6.3). See also perceptual bias of conscious experience. 

conscious contents. Either qualitative conscious experiences or readily accessible nonqualitative conscious events that are reported as being conscious. 

conscious experience. See qualitative conscious experiences, conscious access. 

conscious moment (2.4.2). See minimum integration time. 

consciousness. Operationally defined as the set of events that can be reported with verifiable accuracy and are claimed to be conscious under optimal reporting conditions (1.2.1). It includes qualitative contents (see qualitative conscious experiences), such as percepts, mental images, inner speech, and feelings of pleasure, pain, and affect; as well as nonqualitative contents (see nonqualitative conscious events), such as currently accessible concepts, beliefs, intentions, and expectations (1.2.5). The operational definition provides a workable starting point about which other properties can accrue, such as the fact that conscious contents load central limited capacity. Theoretically, a conscious event is defined in GW theory as a mental representation that is broadcast globally (see global distribution), that is internally consistent, informative, and tends to be expressed in perceptual code (see perceptual bias) (11.4). See necessary conditions for conscious experience and access, conscious access versus conscious experience. 

consistency. See necessary conditions for consciousness. 

constructivism (1.3.5, 2.3.2, 10.1). The view that conscious experience involves a constructed reality that goes beyond its component inputs (Mandler, 1983. 1984; Marcel T. 1983a). 

content. See conscious content.

contextualization (5.34). The process by which a conscious content becomes unconscious (due to practice and adaptation), and thereby becomes part of a new frame — it serves to constrain future conscious contents. See also frame, objectification, decontextualization. 

contrastive analysis. The empirical evidence for GW theory is summarized in several sets of paired contrasts between similar conscious and unconscious events (see Index of Tables and Figures). For example, novel tasks tend to be much more conscious in the beginning than they are after practice, even though their physical and psychological role may be quite similar. These contrasts are analogous to experiments in which consciousness is the independent variable (1.2.2-1.2.4, 2.1). 

Control Function of consciousness. In GW theory, conscious goal-images serve to control action (10.4). See also ideomotor theory. 

cooperation (cooperative processing, coalition formation). Specialized processors can work together in pursuit of some consciously broadcast goal. Cooperating systems can, over time, come to constitute new specialized processors (2.3.2.). When framed systems cooperate in this fashion they can be represented as a Frame Stack (4.3.2).

cortical arousal. Electrical activity in the cerebral cortex that is typically fast, low amplitude, and desynchronized. It is associated with waking consciousness and mental activity. Stimulation of the Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating System (ERTAS) leads to widespread cortical activation (3.1).

countervoluntary actions. See involuntary actions.

deautomatization. The tendency of automatic skills after disruption to break apart into more consciously accessible components, as in attempting to read material that is printed upside-down (1.4.4). 

Debugging Function of consciousness. People tend to become conscious of violated expectations. Conscious error detection may be necessary for such errors to be mended (“debugged”), though the details of repair are of course unconscious (10.3).

Decision-making Function of consciousness. GW theory suggests that voluntary decisions may involve a “voting procedure” in which competing sets of specialized processors add activation to alternative global messages. Those receiving the most votes tend to remain conscious longest and thus have the “last word.” The ideomotor theory suggests that the last in a series of conscious experiences will tend to recruit effective action, so that having the last word in the mental dialogue is extremely important (7.6.1, 10.6). 

decontextualization (4.1.4). See objectification.

default execution of goal-images. The ideomotor theory states that conscious goal​‐ images tend to be executed “impulsively” or by default, unless competing goal-images or intentions prevent execution (7.3). 

Definitional Function of consciousness. In GW theory, conscious contents are shaped and evoked by unconscious frames, interacting through the global workspace. Thus multiple knowledge sources interact to define the conscious contents, by bringing the proper frame to bear, and by resolving ambiguities of interpretation (2.3.2; 4.2; 10.1). See also Frame-setting Function. 

Depersonalization. A type of self-alien experience in which the victim feels estranged from him or herself. This condition is apparently very common in late adolescence and early adulthood, and places constraints on the notion of self (9.1).

derealization. A condition in which the world is perceived accurately, but is felt to be unreal (9.1). See also depersonalization. 

Diffuse Thalamic Projection System (3.12). See Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating System. 

Disambiguation (2.3.2, 4.1.3). In the GW framework, a major function of consciousness is to allow multiple knowledge sources to interact in order to remove ambiguity in focal contents. See also Definitional Function of consciousness. 

disavowed goals or emotions (7.82). In many cases people can be shown to disavow goals or emotions which, by other empirical criteria, they clearly have. This suggests a conflict between voluntary and involuntary expression of goals and a breakdown of metacognitive access. The ideomotor theory suggests one account of these conflict phenomena (7.8).

dissociation. Normally unitary functions are sometimes decomposed; conscious access to these functions may be lost, at least for some time. Decomposability is one source of evidence for specialized processors. Dissociation is observable in memory access, knowledge representation, motor control, perception, and self-states (1.4, 9.1). 

distributed system. A decentralized information-processing system, in which many specialized processors work cooperatively to solve shared problems. GW theory describes one such system. (1.3.6, 2.2). 

Dominant Frame. See Dominant Frame Stack. 

Dominant Frame Stack. A coherent set of frames that controls current access to the global workspace. Both conceptual and goal frames seem to be hierarchically organized, although competing frames can disrupt any given level of the Dominant Frame Stack (4.3.2, 6.4.2). 

Dominant Goal Frame. A goal frame that dominates the global workspace, thereby controlling access to the limited-capacity system. A nested set of Dominant Goal Frames make up a Dominant Frame Stack. 

Dominant Goal Hierarchy. One kind of Dominant Frame Hierarchy, consisting of nested goal frames that together constrain access to the global workspace. It is particularly important in problem solving, voluntary control, and the self system (4.32, 6.42, 9.22). 

dual-task measures of central limited capacity. Two simultaneous tasks will interfere with each other if they involve consciousness or mental effort, even though they may be very different from each other. This is one source of evidence for central limited capacity (1.3.4).

editing. The Dominant Goal Hierarchy shapes normal, voluntary action (1.0). Conscious components of the goal structure are broadcast globally, so that unconscious specialized processors can compete against (edit) those goal-images they find flawed. Since the most informative components typically become conscious (i.e., those that are novel, significant, or conflictful), it follows that these components of voluntary action must have been tacitly edited prior to execution if there was enough time to do so (7.3.2). 

Editing Function of consciousness (10.3). Conscious events are broadcast to multiple unconscious systems, which can compete against it if it violates their criteria. See also Flagging Function, Debugging Function. 

editing time (1.5.1). In the GW version of the ideomotor theory of voluntary control, the time between the onset of a goal-image and its interruption by unconscious receiving processors able to spot errors. See also horse-race model, execution time.

Effort, mental. See mental effort. 

ego-dystonic. See self-alien experiences. 

ego-syntonic. See self-attributed experiences. 

emotional conflict. See goal conflict. 

empirical constraints on any theory of conscious experience. See contrastive analysis. 

Enduring Dispositions. A term used by Kahneman (1973), corresponding to long term Contexts in GW theory (e.g., 9.2). 

episodic memory. The repository of conscious, autobiographical experiences, which, judged by sensitive memory measures such as recognition tasks, appears to be extremely large (Tulving, 1972, 1985; Bransford, 1979). See also semantic memory. 

Event identity after learning, the problem of. If conscious events create new frames, and frames shape later conscious experiences of the same event, it follows that the event should be experienced differently at a later time. Thus the experienced identity of the event changes with learning. This seems paradoxical, but it may be a characteristic feature of the growth of knowledge, as Kuhn notes in the case of science (5.7).

execution time (7.5.1). The time from the onset of a goal-image to the execution of an action recruited by the image. If execution time is shorter than editing time, a slip of speech or action is likely to occur (7.3.2, 7.5). See also horse-race model, ideomotor theory. 

Executive Function of consciousness. In GW theory, consciousness is associated with a global workspace in a distributed system consisting of many specialized processors. This architecture does not involve executive systems in the first instance, just as a television broadcasting station does not necessarily involve a government. However, the global workspace may be utilized by executive goal frames to control a great variety of activities in the nervous system. See biofeedback training, voluntary control (2.7.2, Chapters 6-10). 

executive ignorance in voluntary control. In the ideomotor theory, the claim that executive systems do not track the details of effector control. (AB normal people can wriggle their fingers, but very few know that the muscles needed to do this are not located in the hand, but in the forearm.) (7.3).

expectation. A nonqualitative, future-directed mental representation regarding external events that can dominate central limited capacity. See also conceptual frame.

Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating System (ERTAS). A convenient label for the set of nuclei and pathways extending from the brain stem Reticular Formation to the outer layer of the thalamus and the Diffuse Thalamic Projection System leading to the cortex. ERTAS is closely associated with sleep, waking, coma, and cortical arousal — all aspects of conscious processes. This system has many of the features of a global workspace (3.1.2). 

Fading of conscious experience with redundancy. See Redundancy Effects. 

failure-driven retrieval of framing knowledge. Presupposed knowledge that rarely becomes conscious can become conceptually available when it runs into a severe contradiction (4.1.4). See also deautomatization, decontextualization. 

feature-integration view of attention. A recent theory suggesting that conscious‐ ness can act as a “glue” to integrate separable features in perception. (1.3.2). 

feedback. Two kinds of feedback may exist in a global workspace system. First, a global message may be fed back directly to its input processors. Second, receiving processors may feed back their interest in some global message, in order to support continued broadcasting of the message. Probably both kinds of feedback exist (3.2).

filter theory of attention. The hypothesis, associated in modern psychology with Broadbent (1958), that the role of attention is to select some aspects of the stimulus world for processing and to exclude others. The role of attention is therefore to conserve processing capacity for the most important things. 

Filter Paradox. There is good evidence from selective attention experiments that unattended (unconscious) stimuli are analyzed under some conditions to quite a high level. This suggests that unattended input involves as much input processing as attended input, and thus vitiates the claim that attention saves processing capacity. GW theory resolves the problem by suggesting that all input is highly analyzed, but only conscious input is widely distributed to a multitude of specialized unconscious processors (2.2, 1.4). 

fixedness. In perception, problem solving, and action, being blind to what is obvious to an outsider. Explained in GW theory as an effect of the Dominant Goal Frame (4.1). 

Flagging Function of consciousness. Conscious (global) display of information can mobilize many specialized processors to work on a common topic. This may happen in biofeedback training, for example (10.3). See also Editing Function, Debugging Function. 

fleeting conscious events. Rapid, potentially conscious, limited-capacity-loading events, which may be quite important in controlling voluntary action, among other things but which may be difficult to report under ordinary circumstances. However, they are often reported in tip-of-the-tongue states (1.5.5). While such fleeting events pose evidentiary difficulties, their presence is strongly suggested by GW theory (1.5.5, 6.5.2, 7.6.4). 

focal consciousness. Usually contrasted with peripheral consciousness the part of conscious experience that allows for the clearest discrimination. 

frame. An unconscious coalition of processors that shape the experience of a moment. (A frame is recursively defined, so that a frame of frames is also a frame.) 

Frame. One of the three main constructs of GW theory, operationally defined as a system (or set of systems) that constrains conscious contents without itself being conscious (1.5.3, 4.2). Framing effects are well known in virtually all psychological domains, including perception, imagery action control, learning, and conceptual knowledge. Theoretically, frames are groups of specialized processors, some quite long-lasting, that serve to evoke and shape global messages without themselves broadcasting any message (4.3.2, 5.1.1). Frames can compete or cooperate to jointly constrain conscious contents. See also Frame Stack, attentional frame, Options Frame. 

frame binding. The process of creating frames. 

frame-sensitivity (2.1). A major property of conscious experience, which is always shaped and evoked by systems that are not conscious. See also frame. 

Frame-setting Function of consciousness. One major role of conscious experience is to create or evoke the frame needed to interpret later experiences (10.1). 

frame stack. A hierarchy of active but unconscious coalitions of processors. 

Frame Stack (4.3.2). A nested set of frames that cooperatively constrain conscious contents. Conscious events are always constrained by the multiple layers of a Frame Stack. Because frames can be thought of as recursively defined entities (see recursive organization), a set of frames is also a frame (4.3). See also Dominant Frame Stack.

frames of communication. For communication to work, the speaker and listener must share a great amount of knowledge that is not conscious at the moment of communication (4.2.4). 

fugue, psychogenic. Literally, a “flight” from reality in which the victim travels away from home, adopts a new identity, and may suddenly rediscover his or her old identity. A syndrome relevant to the issue of self (self-system) in relation to conscious experience (9.1). See also depersonalization, self-alien experiences. 

functions of conscious experience. Like other major biological phenomena, consciousness plays more than one significant adaptive role. Some 18 separable functions can be specified (10.0). 

functional equivalents of a global workspace system (2.6.1). Global Workspace theory claims that consciousness is associated with something like a global workspace, but that many system architectures can behave in a functionally equivalent way. One can think of the system as a “searchlight” rather than a “blackboard,” for example, or even as a series of mental senses, only one of which can operate at a time. All these systems seem to operate in much the same way. 

functional unity of specialized processors. In the act of riding a bicycle, steering, peddling, balance, and visual perception are closely coordinated in a single processing coalition. This coalition may be decomposed and reorganized when one steps off the bicycle and begins to walk. In the same sense, perhaps any specialized processor can be functionally unitary in a given task, but may be decomposed and reorganized for some other task. (1.4.5). See also dissociation, cooperative processing.

global access. The ability of many specialized processors to place or support messages on the global workspace. The input side of global distribution. 

global broadcasting. See also global distribution. 

global distribution of conscious information (global broadcasting). The ability of conscious signals to be made available very widely to numerous specialized processors. The output side of global access. (2.5) 

Global Input Processors. (2.6.4) It may be that only some processors can provide input to the global workspace, and that others merely act as Global Receiving Processors. The evidence for the perceptual bias of conscious contents suggests that perceptual and imaginal systems may indeed be special and that global input might be limited to perceptual or quasi-perceptual events. Effector control systems, for example, may only be able to receive global information, but not to access the global workspace directly. On this question our current evidence is not decisive, so that we merely define a theoretical choice-point to define the alternatives, leaving the answer open for the time being. 

Global Receiving Processors. (2.6.4) See Global Input Processors. 

global variable. In computer science, a variable that is defined for more than one subsystem of a larger system. 

global workspace. A memory that can be accessed by numerous specialized processors, whose contents are widely broadcast or distributed, in principle to all specialists in the nervous system. One of the three major constructs of GW theory (2.2). 

Global Workspace System (2.3). The entire set of theoretical entities postulated in GW theory, including specialized processors, the global workspace, and framing systems. 

Global Workspace (GW) theory. The theory developed in this book, which associates conscious experience with a rather simple architecture of the psychological system. GW theory has three basic constructs: a global workspace, a set of specialized unconscious processors, and a set of unconscious frames that serve to shape, evoke, and define conscious contents (2.2). 

globally informative (5.3.1). See informativeness. 

goal. A representation of a future state that serves to recruit and guide subgoals and motor systems needed to reach that state. Classically, behavioral persistence in working towards an end-state in the face of obstacles, has been taken as operational evidence for the existence of a goal. 

goal addressability. Some specialized processors seem to be responsive to goals, especially conscious goals (1.4.5, 7.2, 7.3). See biofeedback training, ideomotor theory. 

goal conflict. A state in which two or more goal frames compete for the ability to dominate the global workspace. See also Dominant Frame Stack, Dominant Goal Hierarchy. 

goal frame. A future-directed, nonqualitative mental representation about one’s own actions that can dominate central limited capacity. A frame that constrains conscious goal-images without itself being conscious. Also called an intention (4.2.3, 6.4, 7.3). See also Dominant Goal Hierarchy, expectation. 

goal-image. In the GW version of James’s ideomotor theory, a mental image of a future state which serves to recruit processors and subgoals that work to achieve the future state. Goal-images, if they are conscious long enough to recruit an action, are generally consistent with the Dominant Goal Hierarchy. The ideomotor theory suggests that conscious goal-images are inherently impulsive; i.e., they tend to result in action unless they are rapidly contradicted by another conscious event, or by a goal frame (see default execution). It is conceivable however that very fleeting goal-images may trigger involuntary actions by well-prepared systems before they have been edited or controlled by the Dominant Goal Hierarchy (7.3). This loss of control may explain slips of speech and action, and even psychopathological symptoms.

 goal structure. See Goal Hierarchy. 

Goal Hierarchy. A multileveled goal structure consisting of goals and subgoals. Each level may be considered a goal frame. It seems likely that people become conscious of underdetermined choice-points in any Dominant Goal Hierarchy (6.1.3,7.3,9.2).

habituation. Most generally, decrease of information-processing activity upon repetition of input (1.2.4, 5.1.3). All neural structures habituate selectively to repetitive stimulation. That is, they will decrease their activity to the repeated input, but not to novel input. Sokolov (1963) has argued that habituation of the Orienting Response (closely associated with conscious surprise) cannot be a fatigue effect, since fatigue would not operate selectively. Instead, he suggests that habituation reflects a learning process in which the nervous system maintains a model of the stimulus even when it has become habituated (and hence is unconscious). Global Workspace theory considers habituation as a Redundancy Effect. 

habituation of awareness is one kind of selective decrease in responsiveness, in which functions associated with consciousness habituate, including the Orienting Response, perceptual awareness, etc. (1.2.4, 5.1.3). See also Redundancy Effects. 

higher-level frames. The higher levels of a Frame Stack, which are more stable and are presupposed by lower levels (4.3.2). Thus higher-level changes in a Frame Hierarchy propagate more widely to all lower levels than do low-level changes (4.4.3, 9.4.4). 

horse-race, countervoluntary errors, as a losing (7.3.2). Unwanted errors occur in the case of slips of speech and action, psychopathology, and voluntarily resisted automaticity (7.5). It is attractive to suppose in these cases that a goal-image tends to be executed by default unless it is interrupted by other editing systems. If editing takes too long, the erroneous goal will be executed. Thus one can imagine a horse-race between editing time and execution time. 

hypnosis. True hypnosis, of the kind found in the highly hypnotizable fraction of the population, is interpreted in Global Workspace theory as an absorbed state, in which the Dominant Frame Stack allows very little outside competition for access to consciousness. As a result, conscious goal-images can exercise great ideomotor control over thought and action (7.7). 

ideomotor theory. In William James and others, the notion that conscious goals are inherently impulsive, and tend to be carried out by default unless they are inhibited by other conscious thoughts or intentions. This theory can be straightforwardly incorporated into Global Workspace theory, and helps to explain aspects of voluntary action, the problem of nonqualitative conscious events, and a number of other puzzles (7.3). 

imaginal experience (1.2). A conscious, internally generated, quasi-perceptual representation, including visual and auditory images, and perhaps somatically experienced emotions (Mandler, 1975a). 

imageless-thought controversy. About the beginning of the twentieth century, an intense controversy about the status of quasi-conscious events that seem to accompany the “set” of solving a problem, and abstract thoughts in general. This controversy was thought by many behaviorists to discredit the entire psychology of the nineteenth century; in fact, it was quite substantive, and raised central issues about the role of consciousness (1.2.5, 7.6.4). 

implicit comparison (5.3.4). All conscious events are said in GW theory to be informative, implying that they reduce uncertainty in an implicit set of alternatives to the conscious event. 

informativeness. In Global Workspace theory, one of the necessary conditions for a conscious event (5.0, 5.4, 11.4). Conscious input is always interpreted in an implicit frame of alternatives, and results in a reduction of uncertainty among these alternatives. If a stimulus is redundant; consciousness of the input is lost because its information content is now zero (see Redundancy Effects). Even the significance of a conscious event, which clearly affects the chances of its remaining conscious, can be interpreted as information provided by the event within a Dominant Goal Frame.

information. Formally, the case of a sender, a receiver, and message channel, in which a signal sent to the receiver serves to reduce uncertainty among the receiver’s preexisting alternatives (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). The mathematical measure of information based on this definition has been extraordinarily influential in computer science, communication engineering, and even theoretical physics and biology. In psychology there has been debate about its usefulness, though it has been successfully applied in a number of cases. We claim that a somewhat broader conception of information is central to the understanding of consciousness (5.0). See also informativeness, Redundancy Effects. 

inhibition. See activation. 

inner dialogue. See inner speech. 

inner speech (inner dialogue) (1.1.2, 1.3.4, 1.5.4, 8.1.6). Clearly one of the most important modalities of conscious experience. It has been widely proposed that inner speech is often abbreviated, and we suggest that, insofar as individuals share a great deal of the frames of communication with themselves, only those elements that distinguish between alternatives in these frames need to become conscious in inner speech (4.2.4).

input (into the global workspace). Input into the global workspace allows global access by many different cooperating and competing processors (2.4, 1.4). There is considerable evidence for a minimum integration time of about 100 milliseconds between separate inputs. The output of the global workspace is globally distributed (2.5). 

intention. See goal frame. 

internal consistency. See necessary conditions for consciousness.

Involuntary actions. Voluntary actions are mainly automatic (see automaticity) in their details, except for certain novel and informative aspects (7.2). Yet even the automatic components of normal action are perceived as voluntary if they are consistent with the Dominant Goal Hierarchy. Other automatic actions are unwanted, or countervoluntary, such as slips of the tongue, voluntarily resisted automatisms, and psychopathological symptoms (7.1, 7.5). It is important therefore to use the term “involuntary” with care, since it can mean either “automatic and wanted” or “unwanted” (countervoluntary). See also self-attributed experiences and self-alien experiences.

learning. Global Workspace theory claims that consciousness inherently involves adaptation and learning. While it is difficult to demonstrate that consciousness is a necessary condition for learning, the theory suggests that there is an upward monotonic function between the amount of information to be learned and the duration of conscious involvement necessary to learn it. See also informativeness, zero-point problem.

learning without awareness. See zero-point problem. 

Learning Function of consciousness. See learning (10.2).

limited adaptability of specialized processors. By virtue of the fact that they are specialized, each of these systems can only deal with a limited range of input (1.4.5, 2.1). 

limited capacity. See central limited capacity. 

lingua franca. A trade language, such as Swahili or English in many parts of the world. By extension, a common language for different neural structures that may do their preferred processing in separate codes (1.5.4). Given the perceptual bias of conscious contents, one likely possibility is a spatio-temporal code (3.2). Many neural structures are indeed sensitive to spatial-temporal information. 

linguistic hierarchy. The standard view that language is represented structurally in a series of levels, going from acoustic analysis or motor control to more abstract levels such as phonemics, morphemes, words, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics (2.3.2). Each of these levels can be treated as a specialized processor, or a collection of them.

logical positivism. Probably the most influential philosophy of science in the first half of the twentieth century; it discouraged free theoretical construct formation in psychology, and the study of consciousness in particular (1.1.1). See also behaviorism. 

Long Term Memory (LTM). The store of permanent memory, generally said to include episodic memory, an autobiographical record of conscious experience, and semantic memory, a store of abstract rules and knowledge (Tulving 1972, 1985). LTM could also plausibly include permanent skills, the lexicon, and even long-lasting attitudes and personality features. See also Short Term Memory.

meditation. Meditative practices seem almost universally to involve repetition of short words, phrases, or visual input over a long period of time. They therefore seem to evoke Redundancy Effects, which are known to directly influence conscious experience (5.7.2).

mental effort (7.6.2, 8.15. 9.2.2). The subjective experience of resistance to current goals. Mental effort takes up central limited capacity, suggesting that it involves the global workspace. Effortful action may involve an implicit comparison between the predicted and actual time to the goal (see also execution time). The perception of effort may be a key to the experience of voluntary control (7.6.2). 

mental workload. Dual-task measures can be used to assess the degree to which a task takes up central limited capacity. To the extent that doing one task degrades another, this loss of efficiency may be used to measure the workload imposed by the first task (1.3.4). 

metacognition. Knowing one’s own mental processes. One kind of metacognition involves self-monitoring, the conscious comparison of one’s performance with some set of criteria (9.3; see self-concept). Metacognitive self-monitoring may be degraded in absorbed states like hypnosis, which may dominate central limited capacity to the exclusion of the conscious components of self-monitoring (7.7). The operational definition of consciousness is unavoidably metacognitive at the present time (1.2).

metacognitive access. The ability to retrieve one’s own conscious contents. There are clear cases of conscious experiences that are difficult to retrieve, such as the Sperling phenomenon (1.1.2). But metacognitive access is indispensable to the commonly used operational definition of consciousness. See also metacognition, source attribution, source amnesia. 

minimal contrasts, method of. See contrastive analysis. 

minimum integration time of conscious experience. The time during which different inputs are integrated into a single conscious experience (2.4). Blumenthal (1977) provides numerous sources of evidence suggesting a minimum integration time of 50-250 milliseconds, centering at about 100 milliseconds. 

Mind’s Eye. The domain of visual imagery. which has many resemblances to visual perception. (2.6.2)

Momentary Access Hypothesis (2.4.3, 5.3.2). The notion that processors competing for access to the global workspace may be able to gain momentary, nonconscious access to send brief global messages in order to recruit more supportive systems. See also Threshold Paradox, Waiting Room Hypothesis. 

Momentary Intentions. Kahneman’s (1973) term, equivalent to short-term goal frames in Global Workspace theory.

necessary conditions for conscious contents. Global Workspace theory suggests that consciousness involves mental representations that are globally distributed, internally consistent, and informative. In addition, consciousness may require interaction with a self-system, and has a perceptual bias (11.4). 

nonqualitative conscious events (1.2.5, 6.5.2, 7.6.3, 7.6.4). Immediately accessible concepts, beliefs, intentions, and expectations that are reported as conscious but that do not have clear perceptual qualities like color, taste, texture, and clear figure-ground boundaries in space and time. (See also qualitative conscious experiences). 

nonspecific interference. Simultaneous events tend to interfere with each other if they are conscious and voluntary, even if they involve apparently quite different systems: Visual imagery will interfere with action control, mental arithmetic with tactile reaction time. Nonspecific interference declines when the competing tasks become automatic with practice (1.3.4).

objectification. Conscious contents tend to be objectlike; even abstract, consciously accessible concepts tend to be reified and treated as objects (1.5.3, 4.1.4, 5.3.4). But the same events after habituation are not objectlike, and can be said to have become framed (contextualized). When framed representations are disrupted, and become objectlike again, one can speak of deframing (decontextualization). 

Object like nature of conscious contents. See objectification. 

operational definition of consciousness. See consciousness. 

Options Frame. A particular kind of goal frame that allows two or more potential conscious contents to be compared, so that one can be selected voluntarily (8.2). An Options Frame is comparable to a menu or directory on a computer. See voluntary attention, Decision-making Function. 

organization versus flexibility. The nervous system encounters a trade-off between responding in an organized way to predictable input (which is fast and efficient), and dealing with novel situations in a flexible way (which is slow and adaptive). The global workspace architecture works to optimize this trade-off (2.7.2, 10.01). 

Orienting Response (OR). The bodily reaction to novel stimuli, first detailed by Pavlov. The OR includes orienting of receptors. desynchronization in the EEG pupillary dilation, autonomic changes in heart rate, skin conductivity, and dilation or constriction of blood vessels. Recently the P300 component of the evoked cortical potential has been added to this list.

parallel processing (1.4.4, 2.1). In principle, different specialized processors can act simultaneously with respect to each other (in parallel), except insofar as they must use the limited-capacity global workspace. See also seriality. 

perceptual bias of conscious experience (2.4.1). The fact that qualitative experiences in perception, imagery, bodily feeling, etc., are perceptual or quasi-perceptual in nature. Even conscious experiences associated with abstract thought, such as prototypes and metaphors, tend to be quasi-perceptual (7.2.2). It is possible that abstract conceptual events and voluntary controls, which we speak of in terms of conscious access rather than conscious experience, may operate through momentary, quasi-perceptual images (7.6.3). See also necessary conditions for consciousness, qualitative, nonqualitative, and ideomotor theory. 

perceptual frame. Unconscious systems that shape conscious perceptual experiences, e.g., the vestibular system. See frame. 

peripheral consciousness. The quasi-conscious “fringe” of conscious experience associated with the periphery of the visual field and other sensory domains, and with the temporal horizon of focal experiences that are just about to fade; more generally, any borderline conscious experience. Peripheral consciousness is usually contrasted with focal consciousness (1.1.2). 

potential frames (4.3.5). Frames that may be available among the specialized processors, and that may be evoked in a variety of tasks. For example, since all actions require detailed temporal control, different actions may use a common preexisting frame for this purpose. This is not just a specialized processor, since potential frames, when they are evoked and begin to dominate the global workspace, can act to influence conscious contents without themselves being conscious. See also frame (4.3.1, 6.4, 7.3.2), Options Frame. 

preattentive processing. A term used by Neisser (1967) and others to describe rapid hypothesis-testing of perceptual input before it becomes conscious (1.24, 2.3.2).

presupposed knowledge. The frame that shapes conceptual thought, but is not readily consciously accessible when it does so (4.2.2). 

priming (4.1). Conscious events increase the chances of related events becoming conscious; they decrease reaction time to related material, and can sway the interpretation of related ambiguous or noisy stimuli. See also Frame-setting Function of consciousness. 

Prioritizing Function of consciousness. Attentional systems, which control access to consciousness, are very sensitive to significance. A stimulus such as one’s own name is apparently made significant by conscious association with high-level goals. Voluntary attentional control can be used to rehearse this association until it becomes routine and automatic, thus guaranteeing automatic access priority to the stimulus (8.0.2, 8.2, 10.5). 

problem solving, spontaneous. Incomplete or unresolved conscious events tend to trigger unconscious problem solving, even if these events are not reported to involve deliberate attempts to solve the problem (6.2). 

process. A set of transformations of a representation (1.4). 

processor. A relatively unitary, organized collection of processes that work together in the service of a particular function (1.4). 

psychopathology. A state of mind characterized by severe and disabling loss of voluntary control over mental images, inner speech, actions, emotions, or percepts. Global Workspace theory suggests an approach to this loss of control through the ideomotor theory. See also involuntary. 

psychodynamics. In the general sense used here, the study of goal conflicts, especially when one of the goals is not consciously or metacognitively accessible (7.8.1, 9.4). A complete psychodynamics presupposes an adequate theory of volition and metacognition. See also ideomotor theory. 

publicity metaphor. The main metaphor of Global Workspace theory, motivated by the need of specialized processors to communicate globally with others to solve novel problems cooperatively (2.2, 2.5). 

qualitative conscious experiences. Experiences like mental imagery, perception, and emotional feelings, which have perceptual qualities like color, texture, and taste. Contrasted with nonqualitative concepts beliefs, etc., that are often described as conscious. See also perceptual bias of conscious events and conscious access versus conscious experience (1.5.4, 2.4.1, 7.6.3). 

qualitative frame. The unconscious shaping frames of qualitative conscious experiences. An example in visual perception is the automatic assumption that light comes from above, a contextual expectation that shapes the experience of visual depth without being conscious (4.1).

range of conscious contents (2.1.2). The enormous range of possible conscious contents contrasts sharply with the apparently limited range of any single specialized unconscious processor. Presumably a syntax processor cannot handle motor control or visual input, but consciousness is at times involved in all of these functions. 

receiving systems. Specialized processors that receive a certain global message. Chapter 5 develops the argument that receiving systems must feed back their interest in the global message, thus joining the coalition of systems supporting global access for the message (5.3). 

recursive organization of processors and frames. Specialized processors may be made up of other processors, and can join a coalition of others (see cooperative processing) to create a superordinate processor, depending upon the current function that needs to be served. Thus a tightly organized set of processors is also a processor (1.4.5). Similarly, a consistent set of frames constitute a frame (4.3.1). The properties of recursively defined entities have been worked out in recent mathematics and computer science. (4.3.1).

Recruiting Function of consciousness. The ability of global messages to gain the cooperation of many receiving systems in pursuing their ends (7.3, 10.4). 

Redundancy Effects. After an event has been learned, repetition causes it to fade from consciousness (1.2.3). This phenomenon is found at all levels of conscious involvement: in all sensory systems, in motor control and in conceptual representation as well (5.1.3). Redundancy Effects provide the strongest argument for the notion that informativeness is a necessary condition for conscious contents. Apparent exceptions can be handled in the same framework (5.4). See also habituation of awareness. 

relational capacity of consciousness. The nervous system’s impressive ability to relate two conscious events to each other in a novel way (2.1, 5.1.1, 6.2). See also frame-sensitivity. 

reminders. In order to maintain the unconscious frames that constrain any given conscious experience, we may need conscious reminders. This is especially true for frames that encounter competition, that are effortful to maintain, or that involve choice-points with some degree of uncertainty (4.4.2). The need for reminders may explain the role of social symbols like membership tokens, rituals, periodic festivals, and rites of passage, some of which seem clearly designed to create an intense conscious experience to strengthen largely unconscious frames.

representation. A theoretical object that bears an abstract resemblance (isomorphism) to something outside of itself, and which is primarily shaped by this resemblance (1.4.1). Operationally, a representation is often inferred if an organism can accurately identify matches and mismatches between current and past experience. Representation is currently an axiomatic notion in cognitive science; it shares many features with the idea of an adaptive system.

repression. Motivated exclusion from consciousness, especially when the process of exclusion is itself unconscious. Some patterns emerging from Global Workspace theory resemble Freudian “repression proper,” sometimes called after-expulsion. This is the case when fleeting conscious goal-images trigger actions before they can be properly edited by processors that would normally compete against them. Metacognitive access to these events may be minimal, since the goal-images are fleeting. They may nevertheless trigger involuntary actions such as slips (7.5.1, 7.8, 8.5). See also psycho‐dynamics.

residual subjectivity. The argument made by some (e.g., Natsoulas, 1978b) that we can never fully explain the subjective component of conscious experience (1.2.7). 

Reticular Formation (RF). A densely interconnected core of the brain stem that extends to part of the thalamus. Ablation of the Reticular Formation generally leads to coma, and stimulation leads to waking and improved perceptual discrimination. Parts of the RF are described here as belonging to the Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating System (ERTAS), a convenient label for the set of neural structures involved in waking consciousness, sleep, and coma (3.1). 

selective attention. A situation in which two or more separate, densely coherent streams of input exist. In this case the subject can only be conscious of one stream at a time. GW theory treats selective attention as a contextual fixedness effect (4.1.2). See also filter theory, Filter Paradox, acontextual. 

self. See self-system. 

self-alien experiences (also called ego-dystonic). A large set of normal and pathological experiences in which people report some form of loss of self (9.1). These may vary from severe depersonalization, to making a disavowed statement or an involuntary slip of the tongue. Self-alien experiences can be contrasted to closely comparable self attributed experiences, leading to a contrastive analysis that places empirical constraints on the notion of self (see self-system). 

self-attributed experiences (also called ego-syntonic). Most experiences are attributed to a “self” as observer, and control of voluntary action is attributed to a “self” as agent (9.1). However, there are important cases where experience and control is perceived to be self-alien. A contrastive analysis comparing similar self-alien and self attributed experiences strongly suggests that the concept of self (see self-system) is scientifically necessary, and provides empirical constraints on this notion. 

self-concept. An abstract representation of oneself, presumably accumulated over many experiences of self-monitoring. The self-concept may involve objectification or an external perspective on oneself, and is presumably used primarily to control and evaluate performance (9.3). Compared to the great complexity and subtlety of the self system, the self-concept as it is most often expressed by people seems simplistic and tendentious. 

self-consciousness. See Self-monitoring Function.

Self-maintenance Function of consciousness. (9.4.4, 10.9). Conscious experiences serve to update the self-system, and at times may severely violate its deeper contextual levels, the frame layers. Attentional control (see attention) of consciousness then becomes a major tool for maintaining stability of the self-system. 

Self-monitoring Function of consciousness. (10.8) One major role of consciousness is to track aspects of one’s own performance, to see if they match one’s self-concept.

self-monitoring, conscious. Tracking one’s own performance by comparison to some set of criteria (8.01, 9.02, 9.31). See also self-concept, self-system, objectification. 

self-system (self). A contrastive analysis between self-attributed and self-alien experiences suggests that the self can be treated as the overarching frame of experience (9.2). In Jamesian terms, this involves the “self as I,” rather than the “self as me” — the latter involves a conception of self as an object of experience. See also self-concept, necessary conditions for conscious contents. 

semantic memory. Memory for abstract, nonqualitative, and probably unconscious rules and facts. See also episodic memory. 

semantic satiation (5.1.3). The apparent loss of meaning when a word or phrase is repeated perhaps a dozen times. See also Redundancy Effects. Verbal Transformation Effect. 

seriality. Events that are conscious or under voluntary control are constrained to occur one after the other, in the limited-capacity bottle-neck of the nervous system. (2.1.5). The same events after habituation or automaticity may occur in parallel. 

Short Term Memory (STM). Immediate, rehearsable memory, which seems limited in size to 7 plus or minus 2 separate elements, if rehearsal is permitted (13.4). The elements or “chunks” of STM are typically letters, numbers, words, or judgment categories, which are themselves quite complex. This suggests that the chunks of STM involve knowledge from Long Term Memory (LTM), so that STM and LTM cannot really be segregated. 

significance. Not all stimuli are equal: Some are far more important than others, biologically, socially, or personally. Global Workspace theory treats significant stimuli as information that serves to reduce uncertainty in a Goal Frame (5.2.3, 9.2.2). 

snowballing access to consciousness (3.21). There are both empirical and theoretical reasons to think that access of some input to consciousness is not immediate, but may involve a circular flow of feedback between potential conscious contents and numerous receiving processors, which are needed to support global access for the potential content (5.3). 

source amnesia. In metacognition, the failure to attribute conscious experiences to the correct event in the past. Posthypnotic amnesia for a hypnotic suggestion is a good example. Source amnesia occurs in normal states of mind when people forget their reasons for having made even a major decision, in part because decisions often change the context of experience, so that the predecision context is lost. This makes recall difficult. Source amnesia is indeed the norm, not the exception, in human development, and is a major source of error in self monitoring. See also source attribution (7.6.4, 8.5.2, 9.5.2). 

source attribution. In metacognition, the problem of assigning events to their proper sources (7.6.4, 8.5.2), especially in attributing the sources of one’s own actions to previous conscious goals or conditions. One’s own goals may be difficult to make conscious; if the goal-images that control novel aspects of one’s actions are quite fleeting, they may be difficult to retrieve, leading to systematic misinterpretation of one’s own goals and motives. There is much evidence for such failures of source attribution, even when the lost information is not particularly painful or embarrassing. See also source amnesia, Self-monitoring Function. 

specialists. See specialized processors.

specialized processors (specialist) (1.4.5). One of the three main constructs of Global Workspace theory. Specialized processors can be viewed as relatively autonomous, unconscious systems that are limited to one particular function such as vertical line detection in the visual system, noun phrase identification in syntax, or motor control of some particular muscle group. Specialists are said to be recursively organized, so that they consist of other specialists and can make up even larger specialized processors. That implies that they can be decomposed and reorganized into another specialist if some other function becomes dominant (1.4.5, 4.4.3, 9.4.4). When a set of specialists provides routine control of GW contents without becoming conscious, it begins to act as a frame (4.3.1). 

specialized unconscious processors. See specialized processors. 

stimulation versus information (5.1, 5.2). There is much evidence that the nervous system is not sensitive to physical stimulation as such, but is instead highly sensitive to information. For example, the absence of an expected stimulus can be highly informative. See also Redundancy Effects. 

stopped retinal images (5.1.3). The eye is usually protected from excessively repetitive input by eye movements, especially the rapid automatic tremor called physiological nystagmus. Nystagmus can be defeated by moving a visual stimulus in synchrony with the eye; under these circumstances, visual input fades quickly and tends to be transformed. See also Redundancy Effects. 

stream of consciousness. The apparently unsystematic “flights” and “perches” of conscious ideation, in the words of William James. Explained in Global Workspace theory as an ongoing interplay between conscious contents and unconscious framing systems, especially goal frames in the process of solving spontaneously posed problems. See also problem solving (6.4). 

subgoals. To solve a problem or execute an action, conscious goal images can recruit specialized processors such as muscular effectors. However, in most cases the goal cannot be achieved directly and subgoals must be recruited. These can be viewed as goal frames that can become part of the Dominant Goal Hierarchy (6.4, 7.2.2). Novel components of these subgoal frames may be broadcast to recruit new resources to work toward achieving the subgoal (7.2.2). 

subliminal perception. See zero-point problem. 

suggestibility (7.7.2, 8.2.4, 9.3.1). Highly hypnotizable subjects apparently treat the hypnotist’s suggestions the way others treat their own inner speech, with a great deal of trust and credibility. The ideomotor theory suggests that hypnosis is an absorbed state in which there is minimal competition against goal images. In addition, metacognitive self-monitoring seems to be limited, perhaps because it requires central limited capacity that is not available during absorption. Under these circumstances, unusual conscious contents are presumably not edited. Credulity and trust may simply result from an absence of this Editing Function. 

surprise. The fact that surprise seems to erase conscious contents has been pointed out by several writers. In Global Workspace theory, surprise can be treated as a momentary erasure of the global workspace by competing contents and frames. The Dominant Frame Stack is disrupted as a result, and works to limit damage to its lowest levels (4.4.3). Surprising disruption of high-level Goal Frames can be stressful and lead to pathology (9.4.4). 

thalamus (3.1.2). Traditionally viewed as a “way station” to the cortex, parts of the thalamus resemble a global workspace with mutually competitive input from a great number of sources and widely broadcast output through the Diffuse Thalamic Projection System. The outer shell of the thalamus (the nucleus reticularis thalami) seems especially well suited to this task. See also Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating System. 

Theater Hypothesis of conscious experience. The view, found in both modern and traditional thought, that conscious experience is much like the stage of a theater in which the audience cannot see the management of the actors on stage. A modern equivalent is the “searchlight” metaphor; an ancient version is the common sense of Aristotle and Eastern thought (1.3.1).

theoretical choice-points (e.g., Preface, 1.5.4, 1.5.5, 2.6.1, 2.6.3, 2.6.4, 6.5.2, 7.6.4). Global Workspace theory generates a number of strong hypotheses, which are stated as clearly as possible to make them empirically testable. Where we cannot support plausible hypotheses we at least state the alternatives as clearly as possible, without giving even a tentative answer.

Threshold Paradox. When does something become conscious? If any global message is conscious, then global broadcasting cannot be used to recruit the coalition of processors that is needed to gain global access for it in the first place. But if a global message is not necessarily conscious, what then are the necessary conditions for consciousness? There are two theoretical alternatives, labeled the Waiting Room Hypothesis and the Momentary Access Hypothesis (2.4.3). The former suggests a hierarchy of increasingly global workspaces, which a potentially conscious content must follow to become truly global and conscious, accumulating supporting coalitions along the way. The latter suggests that all systems may have brief global access in order to recruit supportive coalitions, but that such brief global messages are not experienced or recalled as conscious. See also fleeting conscious events, snowballing access. 

Tip-of-the-iceberg Hypothesis of conscious experience. The view that consciousness is only the visible tip of a very large and invisible iceberg of unconscious processes (1.3.1). 

Tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) phenomenon. The process of searching for a known but elusive word, which clearly involves a set of criteria for the missing word, though these criteria are not qualitatively conscious. The criteria are said to constitute an intention or goal frame. Further, people often report a fleeting but unretrievable mental image of the missing word, indicating that there may indeed be fleeting conscious events (6.1, 7.6.4, 8.5.2). 

top-down contextual influences (4.1). The conscious experience of sensory input is always shaped by unconscious frames. 

triadic pattern. Many types of spontaneous problem solving show a conscious stage of problem assignment, followed by unconscious incubation of routine problem components, and culminating in conscious display of the solution (6.2, 6.4).

unconscious, operational and theoretical definitions of. When people are asked under optimal conditions to retrieve some information that is clearly represented in the nervous system, and they cannot do so, we are willing to infer the existence of unconscious events (1.2.1, 1.4.1). Examples are the regularities of syntax and the properties of highly automatic tasks. Global Workspace theory suggests that we are unconscious of anything that does not meet all the necessary conditions for conscious experience. This implies that there are several ways for something to be unconscious (11.4). 

unconscious choice-points in the flow of processing. Complex processes involve many choice-points between alternative representations. For example, in speech perception the linguistic system must often choose between two alternative meanings of a word. Which choice is made can often be influenced by previous conscious experiences (4.1.3, 7.7.2). See also priming. 

underdetermined choice-points in the control of action (7.7.2). Choice-points in the control of action may be quite uncertain; consciousness may be necessary to help resolve the uncertainty. Underdetermined choice-points are likely to become conscious because they involve points of high uncertainty. See also ambiguity. 

universal editing (1.3.2). A conscious goal-image is thought to be broadcast globally to all specialized processors in the system. This suggests that perhaps all processors can also compete against conscious goal-images and thus interrupt execution of a planned action. See also editing. 

updating. Many unconscious specialized processors may simultaneously track conscious experiences in order to update each of their special domains in the light of current circumstances (5.1.4).

variable composition of specialized processors. See recursive organization. 

Verbal Transformation Effect. The perceived phonetic shift in words that are presented to a passive listener over and over again for an approximate duration of 30- 60 seconds. Treated here as a shift in perceptual framing (5.4.1). 

vigilance. The task of monitoring conscious signals, often quite repetitive ones. A difficult task that declines in accuracy in a matter of minutes. See also Redundancy Effects. 

violations of frames. Frames can be treated as a set of expectations about conscious experiences, and of course expectations can be violated. Often violation of contextual expectations causes them to become consciously accessible (4.1.4). In the Frame Stack, deeper violations propagate more widely and demand more extensive adaptation to rebuild a functioning Frame Stack (4.4.3, 9.4.4). See also surprise-failure-driven retrieval of framed knowledge.

voluntary action (7.0). Action that is consistent with one’s Dominant Goal Hierarchy, and hence is generally self-attributed. Because the conscious components of the Goal Hierarchy are globally broadcast, so that many systems have access to them; hence these conscious components are tacitly edited by multiple criteria. Developmentally one can argue that at some point in one’s history, all informative and significant components of a voluntary action must have been edited. See also ideomotor theory.

voluntary attention. Attention is defined here as the control of access to consciousness. Since Global Workspace theory claims that voluntary control involves conscious (though often fleeting) goal-images, it follows that voluntary attention is conscious control of access to consciousness (8.1.2). This can be accomplished through the use of an Options Frame, comparable to a menu or directory on a computer, which allows different conscious options to become readily available, so that one can choose voluntarily between them. 

voluntary control. See voluntary action.

Waiting Room Hypothesis (2.4.3, 5.3.2). The notion that a hierarchy of work spaces with increasingly widespread broadcasting ability may be required to allow processors attempting to gain GW access to compete before becoming conscious. See also Threshold Paradox, Momentary Access Hypothesis. 

wakefulness. In Global Workspace theory, a state in which the global workspace is operating. Parts of the ERTAS system are known to be involved in the maintenance of wakefulness and sleep (3.1). See also cortical arousal. 

working memory. See Short-Term Memory.

zero-point problem. It is remarkably difficult to find indisputable evidence about events near the threshold of conscious experience, such as subliminal perception, learning without awareness, and the problem of “blind sight.” Because zero-point evidence is so controversial, the present approach is based initially on contrastive analysis of clear cases that are not disputed. Much can be accomplished in this way. Only after establishing a reasonable framework based on agreed-upon evidence do we suggest hypotheses about the zero point (Preface, 1.1.2, 7.6.4). See also fleeting conscious events.